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THE DECLINE OF TRADITIONAL PENSIONS, THE IMPACT OF THE
PENSION PROTECTION ACT OF 2006, AND THE FUTURE OF
AMERICA'S DEFINED-BENEFIT PENSION SYSTEM
JOSHUA GAD-HARF*
INTRODUCTION
Since the 1920s, most workers relied on their employers to provide
them with steady requirement income as a reward for many decades of hard
work and sacrifice.' Employers issued "traditional" pensions plans2 to their
employees, which provided employees with income long after their terms
of employment had ended. Employees understood that, if they gave their
working years to their employer, their employer would, in turn, provide
them with a return on their investment-a worry-free retirement.
Today, that era has ceased to exist as we know it. Most employers
have replaced traditional pension plans with defined-contribution plans that
offer little or no guaranteed benefits. This is a relatively new phenomenon
and it is important to discuss how and why our country has gotten to the
point where employers are no longer expected to provide traditional pen-
sion plans for their employees. Traditional pension plans are a dying breed
because many of these traditional pension plan sponsors are losing their
economic viability-ironically, in part, because of their pension obliga-
tions. Pension promises are usually among the first cuts when companies
recognize early signs of economic hardship.
Part I of this note discusses the background of the federal govern-
ment's pension insurance corporation-the Pension Benefit Guaranty Cor-
poration (PBGC). Part II elaborates on the downfall of the PBGC and
traditional pension plans. Part III details the Pension Protection Act of
2006, which was intended to protect American workers from the failing
* Juris doctor candidate, May 2008, Chicago-Kent College of Law. The author would like to
thank his parents, grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousins, Danielle Tobias, Professor Jeffrey G. Sherman,
Clare Willis, the editorial staffs of the Chicago-Kent Law Review during the 2006-2007 and 2007-2008
school years, and the scholars on whose work he relies.
1. Susan J. Stabile, Is It Time to Admit the Failure of an Employer-Based Pension System?, II
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 305, 307 (2007).
2. Throughout this note, the term "traditional pension plans" is used interchangeably with "de-
fined-benefit pension plans."
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pension system. Finally, this note concludes by arguing that the Pension
Protection Act cannot accomplish congressional goals. Traditional pension
plans will soon be obsolete and workers will eventually be forced to be
completely self-reliant for their retirement savings.
I. PRIMER: THE PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION
Title IV of the Employee Retirement Security Act (ERISA) created
the PBGC, a government-owned corporation, in 1974. 3 Modeled after the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 4 the PBGC was designed "to en-
courage the continuation and maintenance of voluntary private pension
plans for the benefit of their participants," 5 as well as "to provide for the
timely and uninterrupted payment of pension benefits to participants and
beneficiaries under plans [that are terminated in accordance with ERISA] ''6
and "to maintain premiums... at the lowest level consistent with carrying
out [the PBGC's] obligations."'7 Today, the PBGC guarantees the pensions
benefits of 44.1 million American workers and retirees, who participate in
30,330 defined-benefit pension plans.
8
In essence, Congress sought to create a fair system that would protect
the benefits accrued by employees during a lifetime of labor.9 To do so, it
enacted minimum funding standards, which required plan sponsors to fund
their plans, and created a federal guarantee that workers' pension promises
would be insured in the event of plan insolvency. 10
ERISA calls for plan sponsors to calculate their yearly obligation to
retirees and any other costs from previous unpaid payments."l A plan hits
its minimum funding standards if the credits to the plan are greater than the
debits. 12 If the value of a plan's assets is less than 90% of that plan's li-
abilities, then the plan has fallen behind its funding requirements and the
plan sponsor must pay into the plan. 13
3. 29 U.S.C. § 1302 (2000).
4. Daniel Keating, Chapter H1's New Ten-Ton Monster: The PBGC and Bankruptcy, 77 MINN.
L. REV. 803, 806 (1993).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(1).
6. Id. § 1302(a)(2).
7. Id. § 1302(a)(3).
8. PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., 2005 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 1
(2005), available at http://www.pbgc.gov/docs/2005par.pdf.
9. See Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 158 (2001).
10. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c).
11. 26 U.S.C.A. § 412(b) (West 2006).
12. 26 U.S.C. § 302(b)(2) (2000); 29 U.S.C.A. § 1082(b)(2) (West 2006).
13. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1082(d)(2).
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The PBGC insures only defined-benefit pension plans' 4 and is funded
by three different means. First, the PBGC generates revenue by charging
premiums to those employers who maintain defined-benefit plans, 15 which
are currently set at $33 per participant,16 plus $9 for each $1,000 of a plan's
unfunded vested benefits divided by the total number of the plan's partici-
pants. 17 Second, when an employer (also referred as the "plan sponsor")
terminates an underfunded defined-benefit pension plan, the PBGC is
awarded a $1,250 termination premium per participant fee, which is paid
by the employer. 18 Finally, the PBGC generates returns from its investment
of these fees. 19
A defined-benefit pension plan can be terminated in three situations.
First, a standard termination is defined by a sponsor who terminate its plan
when the assets of the plan meet or exceed its liabilities. To do so, the plan
sponsor must purchase annuities to cover its employees' accrued benefits.20
Because the plan is sufficiently funded, the plan sponsor may terminate the
plan whenever it chooses.21 The PBGC's insurance function need not be
initiated because the assets exceed liabilities.
The second form of pension termination is a distress termination initi-
ated by the plan sponsor. 22 In such a termination, the sponsor of an under-
funded plan must demonstrate to the PBGC that its plan is in financial
distress. The PBGC will allow a distress termination and take over the
plan's pension obligations if: (1) the plan sponsor seeks to terminate the
plan during the course of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding or a similar
state-law insolvency proceeding; 23 (2) the plan sponsor shows that continu-
14. Defined-benefit pension plans differ from defined-contribution pension plans, such as 401(k)s
and Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOP), where the employer and employee are jointly responsi-
ble for the maintenance of the pension fund. This note focuses solely on defined-benefit pension plans;
any future reference to pension plans refer to the defined-benefit variety.
15. 29 U.S.C. § 1306.
16. For funding obligations for single-employer pension plans, see id. § 1306(a)(3)(A)(i). See also
Notice of PBGC Flat Premium Rates, 72 Fed. Reg. 67,765 (Nov. 30, 2007) (updating funding numbers
for 2007).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(3)(E)(ii).
18. See Ann vom Eigen, Legislative Highlights: Filing Fees and Pension Premium Increases
Pending as Second Session Begins, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2006, at 8.
19. Johnathan E. Collins, Comment, Airlines Jettison Their Pension Plans: Congress Must Act To
Save the PBGC and Protect Plan Beneficiaries, 70 J. AIR L. & COM. 289, 295 (2005).
20. Id. § 1341(c)(3)(D)(ii)(Il). This note will not focus on standard terminations because the
PBGC is not implicated. Even a company under Chapter II bankruptcy protection, engaging in a
standard termination, does not need the assistance of the PBGC because its assets can fully fund any
outstanding pension liabilities.
21. There are two other requirements: (I) the plan sponsor must provide sixty-days notice to each
affected party that it intends to terminate the plan; and (2) the sponsor must adhere to any collective
bargaining agreements. 29 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2)-(3).
22. See id. § 1341(c).
23. Id. § 1341(c)(2)(B)(i).
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ing the pension fund will prevent its successful reorganization under Chap-
ter 11 ;24 (3) the plan sponsor shows that it will not be able to pay its debts
when they come due if it continues to fund the plan; 25 or (4) the plan spon-
sor convinces the PBGC that the plan must be terminated to avoid an un-
reasonably burdensome pension cost increase due to the decline in the
number of plan participants.2 6 If the PBGC determines that the plan spon-
sor has met one of these criteria, it will terminate the plan and assume the
plan's assets and liabilities, 27 but the plan sponsor will remain liable to the
PBGC for the plan's liabilities. 28 If the sponsor is under Chapter 1 1 bank-
ruptcy protection,29 the amount of the plan's unfunded liabilities usually
becomes a general unsecured claim given to the PBGC.
The final form of termination is an involuntary termination initiated
by the PBGC. The PBGC may involuntarily terminate a plan if it can show
proper cause by arguing either: (1) the plan sponsor has not met minimum
funding standards required under 26 U.S.C. § 412;30 (2) the plan will not be
able to pay benefits when they come due;31 or (3) the potential long term
loss to the PBGC "may reasonably be expected to increase unreasonably if
the plan is not terminated. '32 Importantly, the PBGC may initiate an invol-
untary termination despite any collectively-negotiated agreements between
the plan sponsor and its unions.33 Just like a distress termination, the PBGC
will take over the assets of the plan and assume liability for the guaranteed
pension benefits.34 The plan sponsor will then be liable to the PBGC for the
unfunded portion of the plan.35
To make up for any shortfall caused by terminated pension plans, the
PBGC must perfect a lien against the plan sponsor and its control group.36
Notably, when a plan is terminated, the PBGC does not guarantee the full
payment of all pension benefits promised by the plan sponsor to the plan
24. Id. § 1341(c)(2)(B)(ii).
25. Id. § 1341(c)(2)(B)(iii)(l).
26. Id. § 1341(c)(2)(B)(iii)(ll).
27. Id. § 1362(a).
28. Id.
29. Unless otherwise noted, whenever the term "bankruptcy" is used in this note, it will refer to a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding.
30. 29 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1).
31. Id. § 1342(a)(2).
32. Id. § 1342(a)(4).
33. See In re UAL Corp., 428 F.3d 677, 681 (7th Cir. 2005).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 1342(a).
35. Id. § 1362(b)(2)(A).
36. Id. § 1368(a).
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beneficiaries. 37 The 2008 cap of yearly pension payments by the PBGC is
$51,750 for every retiree who retires at age sixty-five.38 Furthermore, once
a plan is terminated, employees stop accruing interest on their pension
promises after the date of the plan's termination.39 The PBGC must rely on
its investment of the premiums paid by plan sponsors to make up for any
difference between the underfunding in the plan and the amount of the lien
that the PBGC is able to perfect.
40
II. THE DOWNFALL: AMERICA'S DEFINED-BENEFIT
PENSION PLAN RULES
One of the inherent flaws of the PBGC's structure is that Congress
placed the heavy burden of monitoring all of the country's defined-benefit
pension plans solely on the PBGC.41 The history of the PBGC proves that
this burden is nearly impossible to bear.42 Not only does the PBGC lack the
resources to gather sufficient, specific, and necessary information about
private corporations and their pension plans,43 but these private companies
have been known "to exert undue influence over the efforts of the regula-
tory agency, thereby compromising the effectiveness of the regulators." 44
These flaws have led to a PBGC with an estimated deficit of between $18
and $23 billion.45 Likewise, total underfunding of all PBGC-insured pen-
sion plans now exceeds $350 billion.
46
37. Of course, this does not include voluntary terminations because plan sponsors who voluntarily
terminate have enough assets to meet their pension liabilities.
38. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., Pension Guarantees Fact Sheet, http://www.pbgc.gov/media/key-
resources-for-the-press/content/pagel3542.html (last visited May 2, 2008). PBGC spokesperson Randy
Clerihue stated that 90% of workers paid by the PBGC get 100% of what they were owed when their
pension plan is turned over to the PBGC. A few exceptions exist, however, such as in the case of airline
pilots, who will probably never get their full pension payouts because these promises are well in excess
of the PBGC's maximum payout. See Kathleen Day, Retirement, Squeezed, WASH. POST, Sept. 17,
2006, at Fl.
39. 29 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(6).
40. Generally, bankruptcy courts read the Bankruptcy Code to permit the debtor-in-possession to
avoid certain statutory liens. Therefore, the PBGC's lien against a debtor-in-possession generally falls
within the class of general unsecured claims, which rarely get paid in full by the debtor.
41. Daniel Keating, Pension Insurance. Bankruptcy and Moral Hazard, 1991 WIS. L. REv. 65, 78.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. Keating calls this phenomenon "agency capture." Id.
45. See PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 34 (2006) [hereinafter 2006
ANNUAL REPORT]. For a discussion of the PBGC's deficit at the end of the 2004 fiscal year, which was
$23 billion and did not include United's pension terminations, see Michael S. Terrien & Brian I. Swett,
Feature: Pension Protection Act, New FASB Rule May Put Secured Lenders at Greater Risk of PBGC
Liens, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec./Jan. 2007, at 22.
46. See 2006 ANNUAL. REPORT, supra note 45, at 34; see also Terrien & Swett, supra note 45, at
2008]
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One of the main reasons for the PBGC's enormous deficit, and one of
the reasons why there was a need for pension reform in the first place, is
that many major corporations that have filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection and terminated their traditional pension plans in recent years.
The airline industry and its large array of defined-benefit pension plans
have posed one of the largest and most publicized threats to the PBGC.
Many officials of bankrupt airlines have argued that bankruptcy was un-
avoidable because of high fuel costs, outdated cost structures, and the in-
tense competition of low-cost carriers.47 Nevertheless, the question
remains: have some airlines sought bankruptcy protection primarily to
dump their pension obligations on the PBGC so they can become more
competitive with low-cost carriers, which do not offer traditional pension
plans to employees?
Terminated pension plans of companies in the steel and airline indus-
tries have dogged the PBGC as its two largest liabilities. The Chicago
Tribune noted that, in 2004, airline and steel companies made up 75% of
the PBGC's liabilities, yet only represented 5% of the total number of em-
ployees covered by the PBGC's insurance. 48 In the airline industry alone,
four of the nation's seven largest airlines filed for bankruptcy protection
between 2002 and 2005.4 9 Unfortunately for the PBGC, the automobile
industry appears to be following in the footsteps of these two troubled in-
dustries. For instance, Delphi Corporation, formerly a part of General Mo-
tors and now one of the leading automobile parts suppliers, 50 initiated the
largest bankruptcy filing ever in the automobile industry on October 8,
2005.51 Delphi's bankruptcy proceedings threatened its employees' tradi-
tional pension plans. 52
47. See generally Eva M. Dowdell, The Chapter 11 "Shuttle"-Coincidence or Competitive
Strategy?, 71 J. AIR L. & CoM. 669, 679-82 (2006).
48. Editorial, The Future of Your Retirement, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 21, 2004, § 2, at 8.
49. See Notice of Bankruptcy Case Filing, In re Delta Airlines, Inc., No. 05-17923 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2005) [hereinafter Delta Airlines Notice of Bankruptcy]; Notice of Bankruptcy Case
Filing, In re Northwest Airlines Corp., No. 05-17930 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2005) [hereinafter
Northwest Airlines Notice of Bankruptcy]; Notice of Bankruptcy Case Filing, In re UAL Corp.. No. 02-
48191 (Bankr. N.D. I1. Dec. 9, 2002) [hereinafter UAL Corp. Notice of Bankruptcy]; Notice of Bank-
ruptcy Case Filing, In re US Airways Group, Inc., No. 02-83984 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Aug. 11, 2002)
[hereinafter U.S. Airways Notice of Bankruptcy].
50. Delphi, About Delphi, http://delphi.com/about/main/ (last visited May 1, 2008) (calling itself
"a leading global supplier of mobile electronics and transportation systems" and stating that it has
"approximately 169,500 employees and operates 156 wholly owned manufacturing sites in 34 countries
with sales of $22.3 billion in 2007.").
51. Notice of Bankruptcy Case Filing, In re Delphi Corp., No. 05-44481 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8,
2005) [hereinafter Delphi Notice of Bankruptcy].
52. Roger Lowenstein, We Regret to Inform You that You No Longer Have a Pension, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Oct. 30, 2005, § 6, at 58.
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Generally, bankruptcy courts allow the debtor to either terminate its
defined-benefit pension plans or negotiate with the PBGC or the debtors'
various unions to come up with a settlement that allows the PBGC to vol-
untarily take over the debtor's pension obligations. Despite the large body
of evidence that corporations would continue to try and shed their pension
obligations in bankruptcy courts nationwide, the PBGC has generally sat by
while these corporations have underfunded their traditional pension plans.53
Many experts argue that there are too many loopholes in ERISA that
allow companies to underfund their plans.54 Even the former Executive
Director of the PBGC, Bradley Belt, acknowledged that there were inherent
flaws. 55 This shoddy enforcement and the significant underfunding of the
nation's largest pension plans have enhanced what many have called the
"moral hazard" inherent with insured defined-benefit pension plans. This
moral hazard is evidenced by the United Airlines, Inc. ("United") bank-
ruptcy case.
A. The "Moral Hazard" Defined
A moral hazard is created when "those who are insured against certain
risks have an incentive to use less than optimal care to avoid those risks." 56
In other words, the hazard is created when individuals are tempted to take
more risk than is healthy for the group as a whole.57 For instance, most
insurance contracts must take into account the moral hazard problem. 58
Once the insurance contract is purchased, it is virtually impossible for the
insurance company to ensure that the purchaser is not taking risks that he
would normally not take if he had not purchased the insurance. 59
The moral hazard inherent in the PBGC stems from the fact that the
plan sponsor and its employees have incentives under ERISA's current
rules to trade wages and health benefits for promises of increased pension
benefits upon retirement. 60 Furthermore, employees have little incentive to
53. For example, Bethlehem Steel and United Airlines were each allowed to stop funding their
pension plans years before they filed for bankruptcy and handed over their plans to the PBGC. See
Justin Cummins & Meg Luger Nikolai, ERISA Reform in a Post-Enron World, 39 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 563,570 (2006).
54. See id. at 570-71.
55. Belt offered as evidence United Airlines, U.S. Airways, Bethlehem Steel, LTV Steel, and
National Steel, which all presented claims in excess of $1 billion to the PBGC during their respective
pension terminations. See id.
56. Keating, supra note 41, at 67-68.
57. Lowenstein, supra note 52, at 58.
58. Eric D. Chason, Outlawing Pension-Funding Shortfalls, 26 VA. TAX REV. 519, 530-32
(2007).
59. Id.
60. Keating, supra note 41, at 71.
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make sure that their employers fully fund their pension plans because they
know that the PBGC is there to back up the plan sponsor's promise. 61 In
the absence of the PBGC's insurance function, employees would probably
demand more security with the investment of their retirement income.
Furthermore, most plan sponsors, unions, and employees never feared
that these pension promises would not be fulfilled: "[d]uring the [1990s]
especially, when it seemed that every pension promise could be fulfilled by
a rising stock market, employers either recklessly overpromised or reck-
lessly underprovided-or both-for the commitments they made."'6
2
As has been shown by the recent bankruptcy filings, the full realiza-
tion of an employee's promised pension benefits is far from guaranteed.
For instance, in the 1990s and 2000s, United increased its pension prom-
ises, thinking it could pay for these promises later.63 In exchange for these
added pension promises, United sought to reduce current wages and health
insurance benefits liabilities. It is this belief that a corporation can save
now, by reducing wages and health insurance benefits, and pay later, when
pension promises came due, that underscores the moral hazard problem
inherent in pension insurance.
The plan sponsor's senior management has the most control over the
risk involved in increasing its pension obligations. These corporate execu-
tives may find it easier to pay off the corporation's employees with future
pension promises rather than with wages that are presently due. 64 The
PBGC plays an important role in this scenario by allowing plan sponsors to
underfund their plans and providing plan sponsors with minimum funding
waivers for a given year.65 Furthermore, for many corporations, these fu-
ture pension promises will never come due because the plan will be termi-
nated. The inability to pay pension benefits when they come due does not
worry many plan sponsors because they know these promises are insured
by the PBGC.
61. Chason, supra note 58, at 530.
62. Lowenstein, supra note 52, at 58.
63. Much of this optimism was based on the successful stock market. United, and many other
similarly-situated corporations, failed to predict the downturn of the stock market at the turn of the
century. See The Future of Your Retirement, supra note 48, at 8.
64. Lowenstein, supra note 52, at 58.
65. The plan sponsor "retains a tremendous amount of discretion as to the level of funding that
each plan will have." Keating, supra note 41, at 73. Note that 26 U.S.C. § 412(c)(3)(A) requires actuar-
ial assumptions to be "reasonable," but there is a generous range given to plan sponsors so they can
fund plans according to their own preferences. "[T]he minimum funding standards themselves recog-
nize and specifically allow for the existence of significant underfunding based on past-service liability
that has been accrued at the time a plan has begun. Employers are required merely to reduce that type of
underfunding over a number of years." Id. at 74.
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Frequently, plan sponsors threaten employees with the initiation of
bankruptcy proceedings, which often leads to pension plan terminations, if
their employees do not agree to wage concessions. For instance, airline
officials told their employees that bankruptcy protection may be a useful
tool.66 Likewise, companies' stock valuations rise when they rid them-
selves of the burden of traditional pension plans, which furthers the incen-
tive to trim pension liabilities. If a company can discharge these liabilities,
it can attract greater third-party investment and therefore become more
profitable. 67
Nevertheless, union leaders, who negotiate most pension agreements,
often seek pension promises that even they know are excessive, in large
part because the PBGC insures these promises. 68 In addition, unions and
their constituents rarely ensure that their pensions are fully funded: "As a
result of federal pension insurance, employees lack the proper incentives to
monitor their employers' funding levels because the employees will not
bear the full costs of their inattention. ' 69 In an effort to resolve this tension,
the PBGC does not insure any and all pension promises, instead limiting
yearly payouts to beneficiaries. 70 Ironically, the PBGC does this to give
employees incentives to make sure their employer funds their plans ade-
quately. 71 Nevertheless, many pension promises are not as insured as most
employees would believe.
This moral hazard problem can be more dangerous than other insur-
ance-based moral hazards, such as federally-insured banks or products
liability insurance, because the PBGC insurance function affects three par-
ties, not two. 72 As noted above, employers, employees, and the PBGC play
a part in this moral hazard. "Typically, the party with a moral hazard will
be the party who both benefits from the insurance coverage and has control
over the reactive risk that is being covered. '73
In the pension situation, both the plan sponsor and its covered em-
ployees benefit from the PBGC's insurance function. Therefore, this insur-
ance encourages plan sponsors and their employees to raise pension
benefits because they know these benefits are insured by the government. 74
66. See Evan Perez, Delta May File for Bankruptcy in Coming Week, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2005,
at A3.
67. Cunmins & Nikolai, supra note 53, at 585.
68. Lowenstein, supra note 52, at 58.
69. Keating, supra note 41, at 75.
70. Id.
71. Id. Keating calls this the "co-insurance feature."
72. Id. at 71.
73. Id. at 71-72.
74. Lowenstein, supra note 52, at 58.
2008]
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When a plan terminates, employees with unpaid pension promises are paid
directly by the PBGC. While plan sponsors do not receive direct payments
from the PBGC, they too become PBGC beneficiaries when the PBGC
insures and eventually pays out pension benefits. 75 The PBGC's insurance
function allows plan sponsors to focus less on current wages, which are
very current liabilities, and, instead, on making promises for future liabili-
ties, or pension plans.
76
When testifying about the problems facing the PBGC, Belt testified in
a Senate hearing that ERISA's "[b]yzantine and often ineffectual set of
funding rules" has promulgated a "poorly designed system that can be
gamed."' 77 In United's case, its "promises of hefty increases in pension
benefits throughout the 1990s and into 2000, when it seemed money was
growing on trees, laid the groundwork for the [moral hazard] problem. '7 8
B. The United Bankruptcy and Its Pension Terminations
The story of the United bankruptcy was well-publicized not only be-
cause of its length, but also because of its employees' lost pension benefits.
On December 9, 2002, UAL, Corp., United's parent corporation, 79 and
twenty-seven related corporations, including United, filed for bankruptcy
protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois. 80 Some of the significant factors that led to United's busi-
ness failings included a poor post-September 11, 2001 economy, strong
competition by low-cost carriers, such as Southwest Airlines, and rising
fuel costs. 81 Nevertheless, it seemed clear from the very beginning of the
bankruptcy that the only way United could emerge from Chapter 11 as a
viable airline would be to rid itself of its pension liabilities. United entered
bankruptcy with $8.3 billion in unpaid pension promises, including $4.445
billion in pension liabilities due by the end of 2009.82
At the time it filed its bankruptcy petition, United sponsored four ma-
jor pension plans, which were all underfunded: (1) a pilots' plan; (2) a
flight attendants' plan; (3) a machinists' plan; and (4) a mechanics' plan.
83
75. Keating, supra note 41, at 72.
76. Id. (noting that companies with insured pension plans often attract employees who are willing
to take lower wages).
77. See The Future of Your Retirement, supra note 48, at 8.
78. Id.
79. Hereinafter United and UAL will be used interchangeably.
80. UAL Corp. Notice of Bankruptcy, supra note 49.
81. Editorial, Airlines: Cut Costs or Perish, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 10, 2002, § 1, at 28.
82. In re UAL Corp., 428 F.3d 677, 680 (7th Cir. 2005); Brief of Appellee United Airlines, Inc. at
5, In re UAL Corp., 468 F.3d 444 (7th Cir. 2006) (No. 06-1222), 2006 WL 2300671.
83. Id. at 4.
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United itself blamed the underfunding on "the combination of the lowest
interest rates in forty-five years and volatile stock market returns. 84 Fur-
thermore, statutory funding requirements required United to pay a special
surcharge called a "deficit reduction contribution," which would have re-
quired United to make accelerated contributions to the plans, had it not
shed this obligation in bankruptcy. 85
Initially, United claimed that it did not want to terminate these pension
plans. Instead, the airline sought a loan guarantee application-a bail out-
from the United States Air Transportation Stabilization Board (ATSB) that
would have allowed United to exit bankruptcy without terminating its
plans. 86 In order to push for this bailout, the airline made efforts to cut
costs to become more competitive. For instance, it eliminated approxi-
mately $6.4 billion in labor costs, $200 million in retiree medical benefit
costs, and $1.2 billion in pension costs. 87 Nevertheless, the ATSB refused
to bail out United, which forced the airline to look for other ways to obtain
sufficient exit financing-specifically, terminating its pension plans-to
exit bankruptcy as an entity that could eventually become profitable, 88
In 2004, in the wake of the ATSB decision, United first stated that it
would seek to terminate its four underfunded pension plans and replace
them with defined-contribution plans. 89 Concurrently, it announced that it
was halting pension contributions altogether. 90 By the end of 2004, these
missed pension payments had amounted to $994 million.91 A United
spokesperson maintained that bankruptcy protection provided the airline an
opportunity to refrain from funding its plans: "Our decision not to make
these contributions was based on our good-faith business judgment con-
cerning our use of cash and need to preserve liquidity during this phase of
our restructuring .... [i]t is the prudent exercise of our discretion under the
bankruptcy code."'92 The profitable low-cost carriers do not offer traditional
pension plans. Therefore, in order to become a competitive airline, United
believed that it had to shed this burden.
Not only was United failing to pay pension obligations and threaten-
ing to terminate its four pension plans, but it was also seeking pay cuts
from its unions through the § 1113 process. Section 1113 requires that a
84. Id. at 4-5.
85. Id. at 5.
86. Id. at 5-6.
87. Id. at 6.
88. Id. at 6.
89. See The Future of Your Retirement, supra note 48, at 8.
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corporation under Chapter 11 protection negotiate with its unions before
changing collective bargaining agreements. 93 United insisted that these pay
cuts were necessary for the company to successfully emerge from bank-
ruptcy.
The unions were left with no choice but to accept these cuts in part
because of "the subtle preferences afforded to airlines by bankruptcy
judges. '94 For instance, United and its machinists' union (United's largest
union, representing more than 20,000 reservations agents, customer service
agents, and baggage handlers) ratified a new five-year contract in 2005,
which cut the machinists' pay by an average of 3.9%.95 The only other
option for the unions would have been to go on strike, which probably
would have been a debilitating blow to the airline and which probably
would have cost the union members their jobs.96 Judge Eugene Wedoff, the
bankruptcy judge overseeing United's bankruptcy proceedings, observed
that "[t]he least bad of the available choices here has got to be the one that
keeps an airline functioning, that keeps employees being paid."'97
Nevertheless, United's unions did their best to vigorously contest the
termination of their pension plans. 98 United's pilots had the most to lose.
During the time of these bankruptcy proceedings, the PBGC's maximum
payout was $44,386.00 per year, which did not start until the covered em-
ployee reached the age of sixty-five. For pilots, the federally mandated
retirement age is sixty, so United's pilots faced the problem of having a
five year gap before receiving any PBGC pension insurance pay-out. Fur-
thermore, United and the Air Line Pilot Association (ALPA), the pilots'
union, had negotiated far higher pension benefit promises than the maxi-
mum payout from the PBGC. According to the Seventh Circuit, "[w]hat the
PBGC can pay is limited by 29 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(3), so vested benefits of
well-paid retirees such as airline pilots [will not be] fully insured." 99 ALPA
and its members had negotiated far higher retirement benefits that were
federally insured-precisely the inherent moral hazard that is present in
this federally-insured pension structure.
Once United terminated the plans, neither the airline nor its pilots
could ensure that the pilots received more than the maximum statutory
93. 11 U.S.C. § 1113; see also Dowdell, supra note 47, at 675.
94. Dowdell, supra note 47, at 675-76.
95. Editorial, A Good Dayfor United, CHI. TRIB., June 1,2005, § 1, at 22.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Brief and Required Short Appendix of Appellant Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l at 4, In
re UAL Corp., 468 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2006) (No. 06-2714), 2006 WL 2617971.
99. In re UAL Corp., 468 F.3d 444, 447 (7th Cir. 2006).
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payouts by the PBGC. To ensure that plan sponsors do not take advantage
of the PBGC's payout limits, the Supreme Court has held that bankrupt
plan sponsors may not offer "follow-on" plans. "Follow-on" plans seek to
make up for the difference between the original pension promise and the
PBGC maximum guaranty.100 For example, if the pilots were promised
$90,000 per year from their pension plan, United could not terminate that
plan, thereby forcing the PBGC to pay out the maximum, and then initiate a
new plan for the pilots that would promise them an additional $45,614 per
year upon retirement (the difference between the original plan's promise
and the PBGC maximum payout).
United claimed to be seeking to reach "consensual modifications"
with ALPA by making modifications to the pilots' plan and to the pilots'
wages. 101 On December 16, 2004, United and ALPA reached a tentative
agreement to terminate the pilots' plan at the end of June 2005. This
agreement called for ALPA to acquiesce to United's proposed distress ter-
mination of the pilots' plan in exchange for $550 million in convertible
notes in the reorganized United and a new defined-contribution pension
plan. 102
The PBGC believed this agreement was unfair. Therefore, before it
was approved by the bankruptcy court, the PBGC sought to initiate an in-
voluntary termination of the pilots' plan on December 30, 2004. Signifi-
cantly, the PBGC sought to put a "hard freeze" on the pilots' plan as of
December 31, 2004, thereby forgoing the additional $84 million in liability
that the PBGC would have attained had the plans been allowed to continue
into 2005.103 When a traditional pension plan undergoes a "hard freeze," no
accrued benefits are lost, but employees no longer accrue benefits after the
date the plan is frozen. 104 The additional liability would have been incurred
because the pilots were to earn additional work credits and an annual cost-
of-living increase had the plan rolled over into 2005.105 Specifically, the
PBGC knew the airline would almost certainly fail to make these required
contributions to the already underfunded plan.106
During the United-ALPA negotiations, the airline began its own nego-
tiations with the PBGC. The PBGC agreed to accept about $1.5 billion in
100. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 642 (1990).
101. Brief of Appellee United Airlines, supra note 82, at 7.
102. In re UAL Corp., 468 F.3d at 447.
103. Id. at 447-48.
104. Stephanie Armour, IBM to Freeze Pension Program: Company Considered Pacesetter on
Benefits, USA TODAY, Jan. 6, 2006, at IA.




stock in the newly reorganized United upon plan confirmation in exchange
for agreeing to continue three pension plans (namely, all plans except the
pilots' plan) through June 30, 2005. The PBGC reserved its right to seek an
earlier termination of the pilots' plan under 29 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(4). This
right conflicted directly with the recent United-ALPA agreement, whereby
United promised not to end the pilots' plan prior to the terminations of the
other three plans. Despite ALPA's complaints, the Seventh Circuit upheld
the PBGC's decision to terminate the pilots' plan at the end of 2004, hold-
ing that the district court is statutorily permitted to set the termination date
of a pension plan. 107 The United-ALPA agreement had no bearing on the
termination date of the plan, once it was initiated by the PBGC, because
both the court and the PBGC were "strangers to the bargain."'
108
Despite its effort to reduce its eventual liability, once all the plans
were terminated, the PBGC was saddled with an additional $6.6 billion in
pension obligations. 109 The terminations cost United employees and retir-
ees approximately $3.2 billion in lost benefits.' 10
C. The Termination of United's Pension Plans Epitomizes the Inherent
Moral Hazard in Federally-Insured Defined-Benefit Pension Plans
The story of United's building pension debt and eventual terminations
is a prime example of how the PBGC's insurance of defined-benefit pen-
sion plans leads to a moral hazard. Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Cir-
cuit noted that United's labor negotiations with its unions throughout the
1990s exemplified the moral hazard inherent in pension insurance: "Insured
parties alter[ed] their behavior to take advantage of the third-party payor;
insurers must respond by making such maneuvers more difficult." 111
Shockingly, after not funding any of its four pension plans from 2000-
2002, United granted a 40% increase in pension benefits to 23,000 of its
mechanics in 2002, just months after the September I Ith tragedy. 112 It
seems hard to imagine that airline executives actually believed it would be
able to make these payments.
The PBGC made sure that pension promises were halted when it
forced the termination of the pilots' plan before the start of 2005. It had no
choice but to object to the United-ALPA agreement, since United was
107. Id. at455.
108. Id. at 452.
109. Dowdell, supra note 47, at 678.
110. Id.
111. In re UAL Corp., 468 F.3d 444, 452 (7th Cir. 2006).
112. Lowenstein, supra note 52, at 62.
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promising six more months of accrued benefits while openly acknowledg-
ing that it would not fund any of these promises. Instead, both the airline
and the pilots would rely on the PBGC.
After United's plan of reorganization was confirmed in January 2006,
the PBGC (which, after the pension terminations, had become United's
largest unsecured creditor) became the single largest shareholder of new
United stock. 113 Through negotiations with its unions and the PBGC,
United was able to shift $10.2 billion in unfunded pension liabilities to the
PBGC during its reorganization.1 14
Meanwhile, United's management received what some parties called
excessive incentive plans that were included in United's plan of reorganiza-
tion. 115 UAL's top 400 managers were awarded 8% of the 125 million
shares of UAL stock that were issued after UAL came out of bankruptcy.
Judge Wedoff noted that, "It may be we have a culture in this country that
overcompensates management, but United is just one enterprise that oper-
ates in that general environment .... [t]he marketplace indicates this is a
reasonable plan." 116 Therefore, tangible punishments for managers promis-
ing unrealistic pension benefits do not seem to exist.
Surprisingly, after emerging from bankruptcy, United posted prof-
its.117 In the second quarter of 2006, United posted a profit of $119 million,
its first profit since 2000.118 In the third quarter of 2006, United boasted a
$190 million profit, as compared with a loss of $1.77 billion during the
same quarter in 2005.119 The company suggested these profits were attrib-
utable to fuller flights and higher ticket prices, 120 but one can also assume
that its exit from bankruptcy, spurred greatly by reducing pension liabili-
ties, was also a major, if not the most significant, contributor.
113. Michael Schroeder & Susan Carey, Pension Board To Trim UAL Stake But Still To Pay Most
Legacy Costs, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2006, at A2.
114. Id.
115. Susan Carey, Judge Approves UAL 's Managers Incentive Plan, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2006, at
A2 (writing that Judge Wedoff overruled United's unions' and retirees' objections to the equity incen-
tive plan).
116. Id.
117. Julie Johnsson, United Aims to Trim Debt: Airline Reports $190 Million Profit for 3rd Quar-
ter, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 1, 2006, § 3, at 1.
118. Susan Carey, UAL Expects Earnings Above Wall Street Views, WALL ST. J., July 25, 2006, at
A2.
119. Johnsson, supra note 117, at 1.
120. Id.
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D. Others in the Airline Industry
The United bankruptcy, which followed the US Airways bankruptcy
filing, 121 was only the start of the major airline bankruptcies. Delta Air-
lines 122 and Northwest Airlines 123 filed for protection in 2005. United's
success story-coming out of bankruptcy and posting immediate profits-
poses the following question: should Congress be satisfied with the busi-
ness model that United used over the past decade? United's situation
epitomizes the moral hazard problem that federally funded pension insur-
ance poses. In the years leading up to its bankruptcy, United made more
and more pension promises to its unions in exchange for wage cuts. 124 Dur-
ing its bankruptcy, the company extracted even more wage cuts from its
unions and shed its pension obligations by effectively forcing the PBGC
terminate its plans. 125 Now the company is making profits in a very com-
petitive industry while the PBGC, backed by the federal taxpayers, has
been left footing the bill for billions of dollars of unpaid pension prom-
ises. 126
One of United's chief competitors, American Airlines ("American"),
chose not to enter Chapter 11 in 2003 despite unsuccessful labor negotia-
tions and the resignation of its CEO. 127 Current American CEO Gerard
Arpey sought to avoid bankruptcy so the airline could control its own des-
tiny: "Bankruptcy, by definition, really puts the problem in the hands of
somebody else."128 While this seems like a logical stand, American has
seen its competitors enter bankruptcy and succeed in terminating pensions
and lowering employees' wages. 129 Airlines like United and US Airways
can now offer stiffer competition to American because of these cuts. 130
Arpey has sought to slash costs by taking such drastic actions as removing
pillows from planes, halting some unprofitable routes, adding more seats,
and even charging for soft drinks. 131 All of these unwanted actions were
forced directly upon the consumer because the airline chose not to enter
121. US Airways Notice of Bankruptcy, supra note 49.
122. Delta Airlines Notice of Bankruptcy, supra note 49.
123. Northwest Airlines Notice of Bankruptcy, supra note 49.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64, 112.
125, See supra text accompanying notes 87, 89-92, 95-97, 101-102.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 117-118.
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bankruptcy. Additionally, because American decided against bankruptcy
protection, it must still fund its pension plans. 132
By staying out of bankruptcy court, American sought better employee
relations, 133 but these improved relations came at a steep cost. "Airlines in
bankruptcy... have a free ride on expensive assets, while competitors
continue to grapple with rising expenses (such as fuel) and on-going inter-
est payment obligations."' 134 Therefore, many experts believe that some
airlines have filed for Chapter 11 protection despite having any real reason
to take such drastic measures other than eliminating pension liabilities. 135
For example, at the time of its bankruptcy filing,136 Northwest Airlines had
$1 billion in available cash and credit. 137 In fact, its finances were in such
good shape that five Wall Street firms had "buy" recommendations for
Northwest stock as late as the day that the airline filed its bankruptcy
documents. 138 "Rather than cut costs by eliminating layers of management
or streamlining operations, these carriers 'hide out' in bankruptcy court." 139
III. THE PENSION PROTECTION ACT OF 2006
When pension programs are underfunded by their sponsors, they cre-
ate a ripple effect on the economy of the entire country. Because of the
burden on the PBGC, it will eventually be unable to insure the pension
plans of retirees. Therefore, the expectations of tens of millions of plan
beneficiaries may be frustrated. This undermines consumer confidence,
which impedes economic growth. These pension terminations force the
retirees who are dependent, or plan to depend, on their pensions to be more
dependent on other public programs, such as Social Security and even the
federal welfare system. These programs are not intended to fully support
retirees, which, in turn, cause many families to struggle to meet their basic
needs. 140 The Pension Protection Act was intended to reverse this trend by
forcing plan sponsors to adequately fund their pension plans, which would
put an end to the drastic cycle set forth above.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Dowdell, supra note 47, at 684-85.
135. See id. at 684-89.
136. See Northwest Airlines Notice of Bankruptcy, supra note 49.
137. Jerry Knight, Airlines Hide Out in Bankruptcy Court, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2005, at D9.
138. Id.
139. Dowdell, supra note 47, at 670.
140. Cummins & Nikolai, supra note 53, at 571-72; see also Donald L. Bartlett & James B. Steele,
The Broken Promise, TIME, Oct. 31, 2005, at 32.
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The highly-publicized United pension terminations and other corpo-
rate pension terminations spurred Congress into action in 2005. Congress
passed the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA)141 to "provide economic
security for all Americans" 142 and to prevent what Senator John McCain
has called a "looming train wreck for American taxpayers."' 143 While the
PPA purported to protect workers' current pension plans, it seemed clear
that the statute really sought to rid the country of traditional pension plans.
Now, employees must fend for themselves as the PPA encouraged defined-
contribution pension plans, which put more of the onus on employees to
save for their own retirements.
Because of the many plan sponsors under bankruptcy protection who
had recently terminated their pension, some view the entire PPA as bank-
ruptcy legislation. 144 While Title IV of the Act 45 purports to make certain
that the PBGC can insure America's workforce a lifetime of pension secu-
rity, it may have the opposite effect. 146 The Act seems to create more diffi-
culties for corporations seeking to shore up their defined-benefit pension
plans. According to Ed Slott, a certified public accountant and retirement
tax law expert, "There are so many new rules, hurdles, reporting and fund-
ing requirements that many companies might just say 'the heck with this'
and discontinue those plans."' 147
A. The Creation of the Pension Protection Act
President George W. Bush and his Republican allies in Congress
claimed to have long hoped to eliminate many of the loopholes and defi-
ciencies inherent in the pension insurance system run by the PBGC.148
These loopholes had created a PBGC deficit of approximately $30 billion
in 2005,149 more than twice its deficit in 2003.150 The Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) estimated that this deficit will skyrocket to $100
billion by 2025.151
141. Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (2006) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.).
142. Id.
143. See The Future of Your Retirement, supra note 48, at 8.
144. Legislative Highlights: Pension Reform Changes Airline and Credit Counseling Requirements,
AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2006, at 8.
145. Pension Protection Act of 2006 §§ 401-412.
146. Humberto Cruz, Retirement Plan More Important than Ever, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 10, 2006, § 5,
at 8.
147. Id.
148. Lowenstein, supra note 52, at 59.
149. Cummins & Nikolai, supra note 53, at 568.
150. See The Future of Your Retirement, supra note 48, at 8.
151. Cummins & Nikolai, supra note 53, at 568.
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In formulating the legislation that he would eventually sponsor, for-
mer House majority leader John Boehner (R-Ohio) sought to change the
pension industry and protect the PBGC from further losses. He stated that
"[i]f the PBGC is forced to assume the airline industry's nearly $30 billion
in pension liabilities, workers and retirees will be left with reduced benefits
and taxpayers could be left with a huge bill."'152 Furthermore, he referenced
the possibility that the moral hazard inherent in federal pension insurance
would continue: "I'm concerned about the possibility of a company using
the PBGC as a pension dumping ground to boost their economic prospects
and get a leg up on the competition."' 153 As noted earlier, this "leg up" was
exactly what United accomplished when its pensions were terminated and
what many more bankrupt corporations may currently be seeking.
Boehner set forth six principal reforms that the PPA purported to
make. 154 First, the PPA sought to provide a permanent interest rate that
would accurately calculate employers' promised pension funding require-
ments. 155 Second, the PPA purported to give incentives to employers to
better fund their pension plans during good economic times. 156 Third, the
PPA intended to reduce the funding volatility in pension plans by ensuring
that employers make adequate and consistent pension contributions. 57
Fourth, the PPA sought to prevent the moral hazard in the system evi-
denced by employers and unions making promises to employees that both
parties know cannot be kept.158 Fifth, the Act sought to give more accurate
and meaningful disclosure to employees about the status of their pension
plans.' 59 Finally, the Act intended to resolve the legal uncertainty to ensure
other pension plans, such as cash balance pension plans, remained a viable
part of the defined-benefit system. 160 Therefore, those who pushed for the
PPA sought to alleviate many of the inherent flaws in the modern pension
system.
152. See The Future of Your Retirement, supra note 48, at 8.
153. Id.
154. H. COMM. ON EDUC. & THE WORKPLACE, 109TH CONG., THE PENSION PROTECTION ACT:
STRENGTHENING RETIREMENT SECURITY, PROTECTING TAXPAYERS BY FIXING OUTDATED WORKER
PENSION LAWS 1 (2005), available at http://www.thepensioncoalition.org/news/PensionProtectionAct_
summary.pdf. For a thorough discussion of the PPA's legislative history, see Daniel B. Klaff, Recent
Development, The Pension Protection Act of 2006: Reforming the Defined Benefit System, 44 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 553 (2007).
155. H. COMM. ON EDUC. & THE WORKPLACE, supra note 154, at 1.
156. Id.
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The PPA also made some significant changes to the defined-benefit
pension system. For instance, beginning in 2008, the PPA phased in a new
requirement that plan sponsors discount their pension obligations using a
higher grade of corporate bonds than the currently required thirty-year
Treasury bond. Furthermore, it required that plan sponsors of poorly
funded plans make additional contributions, or "catch-up" payments, and
limits some of the benefits that these plans can provide. 161 Also, the PPA
required the variable-rate premiums paid to the PBGC to be based on 100%
of the plan's underfunding-a plan sponsor must pay the PBGC $9 per
$1,000 of underfunding. 162
In an effort to protect the PBGC, the PPA also made the following
changes to the pension funding rules for defined-benefit plans: (1) it limited
the ability of plans with less than an 80% funding ratio to make lump-sum
payments or increase benefits; (2) it required plans with funding ratios less
than 60% to freeze normal benefit increases; and (3) it prohibited plans
from paying benefits for unpredictable contingent events, such as shutdown
benefits to employees of facilities that are closed down. 163
The CBO estimated that the PPA would reduce federal spending by $5
billion from 2007 through 2016, but the CBO also expressed the belief that
the PPA would decrease federal revenues for the same period by $72.9
billion. Furthermore, during the same 2007-2016 period, the CBO noted
that the PBGC's premium receipts should increase by $5.8 billion, while its
net benefit payments should increase by only $0.3 billion. 164
As noted earlier, Congress intended to end the age of large corpora-
tions supporting the retirements of their employees through traditional pen-
sion plans. The PPA encourages employees to contribute to employer-
sponsored defined-contribution plans such as a 401(k). 165 These defined-
contribution plans differ from defined-benefit plans because employees do
not earn pension promises from their employers based on length of em-
ployment and salary. Instead, plans such as 401(k)s are financed in full or
in part by the employees themselves. One of the significant problems with
defined-contribution pension plans is that most Americans do not invest
properly when they are put in charge of their own retirement savings. 166
Perhaps for this reason, the PPA encourages employers to automatically
161. See Terrien & Swett, supra note 45, at 22.
162. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE FOR H.R. 4: PENSION PROTECTION ACT OF 2006, at
4-5 (2006), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/74xx/doc7493/hr4pgo.pdf.
163. Id. at 8.
164. Id. at 1.
165. Stabile, supra note 1, at 318; see also Cruz, supra note 146, at 8.
166. Cruz, supra note 146, at 8.
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enroll their employees in defined-contribution plans, unless an employee
opted out of the plan. 167 This change was expected to increase participation
in defined-contribution plans by 66% to 92%.168
Furthermore, the PPA allows employers to automatically increase con-
tribution rates into defined-contribution plans if an employee receives a
raise. Likewise, it allows the employer to automatically invest its employ-
ees' retirement funds in a diversified portfolio. Finally, it makes it easier
for employees to sell their stock in their own company, in order to have a
more diversified portfolio.169
The PPA's preference for 401 (k)s seemed to be recognition of the fact
that traditional pension plans are no longer viable options for corporations.
A worker's retirement security is now up to the employee and 401(k)s put
the burden on the employee to save. 170 To assist in educating employees
about their retirement choices, the PPA encourages employers to make
independent financial advisers available to their employees. Hence, work-
ers would control their individual retirement savings, instead of having the
insurance of a federally-insured defined-benefit pension plan maintained by
their employer. This would benefit the PBGC and taxpayers who subsidize
the federal corporation.
B. Title IV of the PPA and Its Exceptions for the Airline Industry
With the introduction of the PPA, the Bush Administration claimed to
get rid of the inherent moral hazard that surrounded the PBGC.171 The PPA
seeks to prevent companies with poor credit ratings from increasing pen-
sion benefits, or from providing further unfunded pension benefits to union
leaders who agree to plant shutdowns. 172 Nevertheless, the PPA does not
provide for the meaningful change it promised when it comes to the airline
industry.
Title IV of the PPA gives concessions to the very industry that many
credit with causing the need for the PPA in the first place.173 Title IV al-
lows those employers that are either a commercial passenger airline or a
company whose primary business is providing catering services for com-
167. The PPA also allows employers to automatically increase contribution rates when their em-
ployees receive a raise. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 162, at 12.
168. Elaine L. Chao, U.S. Sec'y of Labor, Speech Before the National Association of Steel Pipe
Distributors in Washington D.C. (June 22, 2007).
169. Cruz, supra note 146, at 8.
170. Id.
171. Lowenstein, supra note 52, at 63.
172. Id.
173. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 162, at 3.
2008]
CHICAGO-KENT LA W REVIEW
mercial passenger airlines to choose one of two pension plan funding alter-
natives. 174 These employers may either choose a seventeen-year amortiza-
tion of the pension plan's unfunded liability or, for plans that do not meet
certain benefit accrual and benefit increase restrictions, the employer may
choose a ten-year amortization period for the first taxable year beginning in
2008.175 In exchange for this funding relief, plan sponsors who terminate
their plans within the first five years after the PPA passed would be subject
to a $2,500.00 per participant surcharge for three years.
176
The preferential treatment does not end there. The PPA gives airlines
that opt for a "hard freeze" of their plans an additional ten years to meet
their funding contributions. 177 In addition, airlines that opt for a "soft
freeze" now have an additional three years to meet their funding obliga-
tions. 178 In contrast to a "hard freeze,"' 179 a "soft freeze" allows employees
who are already covered by the pension plan to continue to accrue benefits,
but restricts the plan to those employees-neither future employees, nor
current employees not yet eligible for the plan, may participate. In essence,
these rules allow airlines to freeze their traditional pension plans with little
or no repercussions.
John Penn, an American Bankruptcy Institute past President, saw the
inherent flaw of giving the airline industry a break. As Penn stated, "Al-
lowing those with frozen plans substantially better terms than those honor-
ing their financial obligations appears to be politically, rather than
economically, motivated."' 180 Penn pointed to the fact that the senators from
Texas and Ohio, the respective home states of American Airlines and Con-
tinental Airlines (the two major airlines that had not yet filed for bank-
ruptcy at the time the PPA was debated), refused to support the PPA
because they believed it gave Delta and Northwest more time to pay off
their pension liabilities, which would negatively alter American and Conti-
174. Pension Protection Act of 2006, supra note 141, § 402(a). The idea of giving preferential
treatment to the airline industry was one of the most controversial parts of the PPA. Legislative High-
lights: Pension Reform Changes Airline and Credit Counseling Requirements, supra note 144, at 8.
175. See Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 402, 120 Stat. 780 (2006); see
also STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 109th CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R. 4, THE
"PENSION PROTECTION ACT OF 2006," tit. IV (Comm. Print 2006).
176. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 162, at 7 ("This requirement, however, may be waived by
the Secretary of Labor if the Secretary determines that the termination resulted from extraordinary
circumstances such as terrorist attacks or other similar events.").
177. Legislative Highlights: Pension Reform Changes Airline and Credit Counseling Requirements,
supra note 144, at 8.
178. Id.
179. See Armour, supra note 104, at IA.
180. Legislative Highlights: Pension Reform Changes Airline and Credit Counseling Requirements,
supra note 144, at 8.
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nental's competitive landscapes.181 Penn went on to state, "If the goal was
to keep companies from freezing or terminating their defined benefit plan,
benefiting those that froze their plans seems counterproductive.' ' 182 Never-
theless, Delta and Northwest said that the PPA allowed them to save all of
their pension plans other than their pilot plans, which both the airlines and
their unions admit are unsalvageable. 183
For example, prior to approval of the PPA, Delta sent a letter to Con-
gress urging it to pass the PPA because it would give Delta more time to
catch up on its payments to some of its pension plans. 184 While there was
no doubt that Delta's pilots' plan would have to be terminated, Delta
claimed to be seeking to save a larger pension plan benefiting 91,000 em-
ployees and retirees.
Therefore, other than the increased pension termination surcharge, air-
line sponsors need not conform to many of the new rules established by the
PPA.185 Ironically, the industry that decimated the PBGC and frustrated the
expected retirement security of many of its employees received a free pass
from Congress.
Nevertheless, this may have been Congress's only option. Had the
PPA not exempted the airline industry from many of these funding re-
quirements, the airlines still saddled with huge pension liabilities would
have had no choice but to seek immediate termination of their plans, which
would have severely affected the PBGC and those retirees covered by the
potentially terminated plans. The more liability the PBGC inherits, the
greater the chances are that the government will have to bail out the PBGC,
which would affect all American taxpayers.
IV. FURTHER REFORM IS STILL NECESSARY FOR THE PPA To
ACCOMPLISH ITS PURPORTED GOALS
Despite the PPA, Congress must do more to ensure the survival of the
PBGC and to guarantee the retirement security of millions of American
retirees and future retirees. In effect, the PPA may encourage more compa-
nies to freeze their plans or leave the pension system outright, precisely the
result Belt claimed he did not want. This fear is exemplified by what some
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. The plans are unsalvageable because Delta said that 1,946 pilots would be eligible for retire-
ment October 1, 2006, which would enable more than half of them to take lump-sum payouts of
$500,000 or more. See Evan Perez, Delta Files to End Pilot Pension, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2006, at A2.
184. Id.
185. See Cummins & Nikolai, supra note 53, at 594-95 (discussing legislation introduced in Con-
gress that eventually became the PPA).
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call the "pacesetter" in employee benefits: IBM, which froze its pension
plans in early 2006.186 IBM said it would "beef up" 401(k) contributions to
its more than 125,000 U.S. employees. 187 IBM froze their plans not be-
cause of the cost of traditional pension plans, but because of "the unpre-
dictability of the plans" 188 and because the plans were "captive to the
volatility of the capital markets."' 189 In fact, there are half as many defined-
benefit plans in the United States than there were ten years ago. 190 The
logical inference is that most corporations with traditional plans will either
freeze or terminate them in the near future, if they have not already. Con-
gress must ensure that the PBGC is ready and able to handle this. Further-
more, U.S. workers must understand that any pension promises they were
given are not guaranteed. Workers must rely on themselves to ensure a
steady and stable retirement income.
A. Since Congress Made Exceptions for the Airline Industry, It Should
Now Make Similar Exceptions for Other Problem Industries
General Motors (GM) strongly opposed the Bush Administration's
proposal that eventually became the PPA.191 GM believed that Bush's plan
would force many old-economy corporations, such as itself, to put more
money into their defined-benefit pension plans just when their businesses
were hurting the most. 192 GM, which is facing enormous financial diffi-
culty, 193 might be underfunding its pension plans because of a lack of as-
sets. In effect, GM must choose between investing in the future of its
business and funding its archaic pension plans. Forcing GM to fully fund
its plans, as the PPA does, could eventually push the automaker into bank-
ruptcy. Like many of the corporations discussed above, GM would proba-
bly then be forced to terminate its pension plans during bankruptcy.
Therefore, by forcing GM to fund its plans, the PPA could, in effect, cause
the eventual termination of the plans-transferring the added burden of
GM's enormous pension obligations to the PBGC. 194 This seems to be the
exact reason why Congress enacted the airline exceptions in the PPA-so
why not the automobile industry?




190. Id. (noting that there were 58,000 plans in 1994, as compared to 29,000 plans in 2004).
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The answer seems simple: Congress favors the airline industry unlike
any other industry.195 For instance, § 11 10 of the Bankruptcy Code 196 pro-
vides protections to financiers of aircraft not given to financiers in other
"capital-intensive" industries such as the automotive or steel industries. 197
Section I 110 requires airlines to assume or reject lease or purchase obliga-
tions for its aircraft within the first sixty days of filing for Chapter 11.198
The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code does not apply in
instances when a bankrupt airline rejects a lease or a purchase agreement
because the financiers are able to immediately assert their interests and take
possession of the aircrafts. 199 Therefore, § 1110 helps airlines obtain fi-
nancing for their aircraft; it provides the aircraft financiers with extra pro-
tection by enabling them to get around the automatic stay.200 These benefits
have never been applied to other industries, including the automotive and
steel industries. 20
1
Similarly, Congress has supported the airline industry with other legis-
lation since the industry was deregulated in 1978.202 For instance, the Sen-
ate introduced the Employee Pension Preservation Act of 2005, which
allowed airlines to restructure their unfunded pension plan liabilities over a
twenty-five-year period. 203 Many considered it a "slap in the face" to other
industries, such as the automotive industry.204 GM had recently borrowed
billions of dollars so that it could fund its underfunded pensions, while
Congress gave the airlines a free pass on many of their pension obliga-
tions.205
Therefore, after seeing the airline industry place heavy burdens on the
PBGC, Congress and the Bush Administration, seem to be drawing the line
at the automobile industry. 206 Belt has stated that there is "[n]o question
our single largest source of exposure is the auto sector" 207 but "[t]he last
195. Dowdell, supra note 47, at 676; see generally Gregory P. Ripple, Note, Special Protection in
the Air/line Industry]: The Historical Development of Section 1110 of the Bankruptcy Code, 78 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 281 (2002).
196. 11 U.S.C. § 1110 (2000).
197. Dowdell, supra note 47, at 676. Very few airlines actually own their own fleet because of the
high costs of aircraft. Id. at 676 n.49.
198. 11 U.S.C. § II 0(a)(2)(A).
199. Id. § 1I10(a)(l).
200. Dowdell, supra note 47, at 676.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 676-79.
203. S. 861, 109th Cong. § (o)(4)(D)(ii) (2005).
204. Dowdell, supra note 47, at 678.
205. Id.
206. Lowenstein, supra note 52, at 63.
207. Id. at 63.
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thing we want to do is chase people out of the system. '208 Nevertheless, the
PPA could chase many plan sponsors out of the traditional pension system,
either by forcing untimely terminations or by forcing plan freezes. There-
fore, Congress must look beyond the airline industry and take a fresh look
at the implications of forcing large corporations to fully fund their tradi-
tional pension plans.
B. Plan Sponsors Must Not Be Forced To Fund Their Plans When Their
Businesses Are in Financial Trouble
Although it may seem counterintuitive, plan sponsors such as GM,
whose plans are not meeting funding requirements, should not necessarily
be forced to increase the funding of their plans, or even fund their plans at
all. 209 The PPA has eliminated many of the pension funding loopholes,
which, on its face, seems like a good idea. Nevertheless, forced funding
could "lead to more companies freezing their plans or leaving the [pension]
system outright. '210 Generally, plans are underfunded because the plan's
sponsor is in the midst of financial trouble. These companies must choose
between following the federal rules by funding their traditional pension
plans and filing for bankruptcy, with the hope of shedding their pension
obligations in much the same way United did: either make a deal with the
unions to terminate the plans or wait for the PBGC to step in and file an
involuntary termination. Regardless, once a plan is terminated, it puts the
strain on the PBGC to initiate its insurance function.
Instead, the federal rules should prevent plan sponsors from increasing
their pension promises unless the sponsor's pension is already fully funded.
As noted earlier, United continued to increase its pension obligations de-
spite the fact that it was already underfunding its plans. United continued to
promise benefits even when it was clear to the airline, its union leaders, and
the government that the company was in dire financial trouble and would
probably never be able to live up to its promises. 211
In order to ease the strain on plan sponsors, Congress should allow
sponsors to stretch out contributions to their pension plans as long as they
pledge not to make further promises to employees for future pension bene-
fits. Congress should also actively force underperforming plan sponsors to
put a "hard freeze" on their traditional pension plans. These changes will
make painfully clear to employees that they must reassess their belief that
208. Id. at 59.
209. Id. at 58.
210. ld.at59.
211. See The Future of Your Retirement, supra note 48, at 8.
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they can rely on their pension for most of their retirement income. This is
the difficult reality of the current pension situation. Many workers will lose
money and the government's insurer, the PBGC, does not have the assets to
guarantee each and every traditional pension plan.
Nevertheless, forcing some sponsors to freeze their plans would stop
the vicious cycle of sponsors making promises to their employees that can-
not be fulfilled. The sooner American workers realize that it is unlikely
their employer will make any significant contribution to their retirements,
the sooner workers will take on the challenge of finding other ways to en-
sure a retirement free from worrying about basic necessities.
C. Changes May Also Be Needed to the PBGC's Priority Within the
Bankruptcy Code
As noted earlier, the PBGC usually becomes a general unsecured
creditor when a terminated plan's sponsor enters bankruptcy. 212 Therefore,
the PBGC gets paid after secured creditors and some unsecured credi-
tors. 213 General unsecured creditors receive only a pro-rata share of the
debtor's remaining assets, which usually means receiving only cents on the
dollar. Belt believes that the government should make it more difficult for
plan sponsors to discard their pension obligations during bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. This would be ideal, but it is unclear whether the government is
ready to implement this plan. Nevertheless, the growing problem of under-
funded pensions has increased the assertiveness of the PBGC, which wants
to maximize its recoveries and contain its losses in the Chapter 1 1 proc-
ess. 214 The senior liens of a debtor's many secured lenders may now be
primed if the PBGC has the ability to assert more powerful lien rights.215
The PPA and the Financial Accounting Standards Board's (FASB) recent
statement regarding the standards for accounting for pension plans magnify
this risk to other secured lenders. 216
While the threat of losing some priority status may pose dangers for
senior secured lenders, it may also benefit the overall funding of the tradi-
212. See Schroeder & Carey, supra note 113, at A8 (discussing PBGC becoming United's largest
unsecured creditor).
213. For the full set of priority rules in bankruptcy, see II U.S.C. § 507 (2000).
214. See Terrien & Swett, supra note 45, at 22.
215. Id. Note, however, that 26 U.S.C. § 412 and 29 U.S.C. § 1368 are generally construed to
"grant a grace period to secured lenders." Id. at 73. This grace period ends forty-five days after the
PBGC's filing of its lien or after the date of "actual notice or knowledge" of the filing of this lien.
Furthermore, "actual notice or knowledge" is ambiguous enough to potentially include information in
financial statements. Id. Therefore, the PBGC may be able to argue that a lender had "actual notice or
knowledge" long before the forty-five-day period would have begun. Id.
216. Id. at 22.
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tional pension plan and thereby aid employees and retirees of companies
with such plans. For instance, in order to ensure that they are repaid by
their borrowers, lenders may formalize and enforce new monitoring proce-
dures over their borrowers who maintain defined-benefit plans. 217 These
monitoring procedures could be pushed forward by the federal government.
For instance, plan sponsors are now finally forced to include overfunding
and underfunding on their balance sheets. 218 This may not go far enough.
Plan sponsors should be required "to timely provide schedules of required
plan contributions and prompt proof that required contributions are made"
as well as up-to-date information about the funding levels of their tradi-
tional pension plans.219 If lenders see that a plan is being underfunded, they
will be motivated to pressure the borrower to fund its plan because the
PBGC may end up having greater lien priority over these lenders should
the borrower enter bankruptcy.
D. The PPA 's Preference for Defined-Contribution Plans Will Eventually
Force American Workers To Depend on No One But Themselves for
Retirement Support
Defined-contribution pension plans, such as 401(k)s, do not promise
anything to an employee. 220 While these plans allow workers to defer
taxes, employers are not required to contribute anything to their employees'
retirements. 221 "These disadvantages were, in the 1990s, somehow per-
ceived (with the help of exuberant marketing pitches by mutual-fund firms)
to be advantages: 401(k)s let workers manage their own assets; they were a
roadmap to economic freedom. '222 Significantly, traditional pension plans
provide retirement benefits for as long as the retiree lives. In contrast, de-
fined-contribution plans have set balances that could run out if the retiree
lives too long: "The [traditional] pension plan can afford to support people
who live to ninety, because some of its members will expire at sixty-six. It
subsidizes its more robust members from the resources of those who die
young. '223 Therefore, defined-contribution pension plans are not a true
substitute for the traditional pension. 224
217. Id.
218. Id. at 73.
219. Id.
220. Lowenstein, supra note 52, at 59.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 60.
224. Id.
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The PPA encouraged 401(k)s and similar defined-contribution plans,
but these 401(k)s depend on the individual to save and "Americans are
rotten at saving. '225 The percentage of post-tax income saved by American
workers has declined steadily for the past three decades; currently, one-
third of American households have no financial assets.226 Unfortunately,
the quick demise of the traditional pension system has led many older
workers into very precarious situations. These older workers are in serious
peril-their standard of living will probably not be the standard they envi-
sioned for themselves when they entered the workforce more than thirty
years ago.
Furthermore, the decrease in the popularity of traditional plans actu-
ally negatively affects the PBGC. While there are fewer defined-benefit
plan sponsors to insure, there are also fewer sponsors paying premiums to
the PBGC, which reduces the PBGC's assets. Therefore, those who phase
out or completely terminate traditional plans and replace them with
401(k)s, which the PPA prefers, actually reduce the pool of sponsors pay-
ing PBGC premiums, which affects the overall fiscal viability of the
PBGC. 227
Finally, while the PPA attempts to save traditional pension plans, in
reality, the private sector has already recognized that these plans will soon
be extinct. Delphi's Executive Chairman, Robert S. Miller, stated that "[a]
pension plan makes no sense in today's world. It's not wise for a company
to make financial promises forty or fifty years down the road. ' 228 There-
fore, it is imperative that young workers today realize that they must start
saving for retirement because it is unlikely that their employer or the fed-
eral government will be there with a safety net to protect their retirement
security.
CONCLUSION
The downfall of traditional pension plans will eventually affect all
Americans. The effects might be seen on older workers who find out that
their employers' pension promises are no longer being kept, or they might
be seen on younger workers who no longer expect their retirements to be
paid for by their employer. It will affect all taxpayers because they will
eventually have to support a PBGC that cannot pay out on all the traditional
225. Jackie Calmes, New Programs Spur Working Poor To Begin Saving, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11,
2006, at Al.
226. Id.atAll.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 14-19 (discussing sources of PBGC's funding).
228. Lowenstein, supra note 52, at 90.
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pension promises made to workers over the past fifty years. The PPA
should be viewed as a stop-gap measure to temporarily fix a system that is
badly broken, not a full-scale congressional solution to the myriad of prob-
lems inherent in the traditional pension system. In the coming years, more
and more American workers will become retirees who have inadequate
retirement benefits. Therefore, Congress must soon act to save those de-
fined-benefit pension programs that are still active.
